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The appeal issues regarding the summary judgments of the
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the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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attached hereto for the Court's convenience.

Any other appeal

issues are governed by case law authority.
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Rule 56

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 32

Rule 32. Use of depositions in court proceedings.
(a) Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible
under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present
and testifying, may be used against any party who was present or represented
at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions:
(1) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of [a] deponent as a witness or for
any other purpose permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(2) The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time of taking the
deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent, or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a public or
private corporation, partnership or association or governmental agency
which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose.
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by
any party for any purpose if the court finds:
(A) that the witness is dead; or
(B) that the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from
the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the United States, unless it
appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party
offering the deposition; or
(C) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age,
illness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or
(D) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or
(E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and
with- due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of
witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used.
(4) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an
adverse party may require him to introduce any other part which ought
in fairness to be considered with the part introduced, and any party may
introduce any other parts.
Substitution of parties pursuant to Rule 25 does not affect the right to use
depositions previously taken; and when an action has been brought in any
court of the United States or of any state and another action involving the
same subject matter is afterward brought between the same parties or their
representatives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfiilly taken and
duly filed in the former action may be used in the latter as if originally taken
therefor. A deposition previously taken may also be used as permitted by the
Utah Rules of Evidence.
(b) Objections to admissibility. Subject to the provisions of Rule 28(b)
and Subdivision (d)(3) [(c)(3)] of this rule, objection may be made at the trial or
hearing to receiving in evidence any deposition or part thereof for any reason
which would require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then
present and testifying.
(c) Effect of errors and irregularities.
(1) As to notice. All errors and irregularities in the notice for taking a
deposition are waived unless written objection is promptly served upon
the party giving the notice.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 32

(2) As to disqualification of officer. Objection to taking a deposition
because of disqualification of the officer before whom it is to be taken is
waived unless made before the taking of the deposition begins or as soon
thereafter as the disqualification becomes known or could be discovered
with reasonable diligence.
(3) As to taking of deposition.
(A) Objections to the competency of a witness or to the competency,
relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to
make them before or during the taking of the deposition, unless the
ground of the objection is one which might have been obviated or
removed if presented at that time.
(B) Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in
the manner of taking the deposition, in the form of the questions or
answers, in the oath or affirmation, or in the conduct of parties, and
errors of any kind which might be obviated, removed, or cured if
promptly presented are waived unless seasonable objection thereto is
made at the taking of the deposition.
(C) Objections to the form of written questions submitted under
Rule 31 are waived unless served in writing upon the party propounding them within the time allowed for serving the succeeding
cross or other questions and within 5 days after service of the last
questions authorized.
(4) As to completion and return of deposition. Errors and irregularities in the manner in which the testimony is transcribed or the deposition is prepared, signed, certified, sealed, endorsed, transmitted, filed, or
otherwise dealt with by the officer under Rules 30 and 31 are waived
unless a motion to suppress the deposition or some part thereof is made
with reasonable promptness after such defect is, or with due diligence
might have been, ascertained.
(d) Publication of deposition. Use of a deposition under Subsection (a) of
this rule shall have the effect of publishing the deposition unless the court
orders otherwise in response to objections.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Thomas F.
Taylor of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for Appellee,
Ford Motor Credit Company, hereby certifies that on the 4th day
of August, 1992, he caused to be served upon Guy B. Zewadski, by
first class mail, postage prepaid, four copies of DETERMINATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY to be included with the

appellate brief filed August 3, 1992.
DATED this 4th day of August, 1992.
SNOW-CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Thomas F. Taylor
Attorneys for Appellee Ford
Motor Credit Company

JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction for this appeal is conferred upon this
Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment in

favor of Ford Motor Credit Company ("FMCC"), dismissing Plaintiff
Guy Barco Zewadski's ("Zewadski'') Complaint for Rescission of
Contract, Recovery of Damages, Deceit, Fraud and Plaintiff's
First Amended Complaint for Rescission of Contract, recovery of
damages, deceit, fraud and unconscionability?

Inasmuch as a

challenge to summary judgment presents for review conclusions of
law only, the appellate court reviews those conclusions for
correctness, without according deference to the trial court's
legal conclusion.

Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d, 497, 499 (Utah

1989) .
2.

Did the district court properly grant FMCC summary

judgment on its counterclaim against Zewadski for amounts due
pursuant to the Lease, attorney's fees for litigation expenses in
these proceedings, cost of suit, and post-judgment interest?
appellate court reviews the district court's conclusions for
correctness, without according deference to the trial court's
legal conclusion.
1989) .

Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d, 497, 499 (Utah

The

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action brought by Zewadski involves an alleged
rescission of contract and claims for deceit, fraud, and alleged
unconscionability of contract.

Zewadski leased a 1988 Ford

Merkur (the "Vehicle") from Rick Warner Lincoln-Mercury ("Rick
Warner").
244.)

The lease (the "Lease") was assigned to FMCC. (R. at

Zewadski filed this action, clciiming that, contrary to

alleged representations by Rick Warner, the Vehicle was defective
because it slid on snow and ice.

(R. at 2-19.)

On that basis,

and sometime prior to filing his Complaint in April 1989,
Zewadski ceased making payments on the Lease, and allowed the car
to be repossessed and sold by FMCC.

(R. at 252-254.)

Based upon

Zewadski's default under the terms of the Lease, FMCC
counterclaimed against Zewadski for amounts due under the Lease
after sale of the Vehicle and for attorney's fees and other costs
incurred in this litigation.

(R. at 26-27.)

On January 2, 1990, the court granted FMCC summary judgment,
dismissing Zewadski's claims in his Complaint and First Amended
Complaint against FMCC.

(R. at 228-231, Addendum A.)

On

August 30, 1991, the district court denied Zewadski's Motion for
Leave to Supplement his Complaint and First Amended Complaint.
(R. at 500, Addendum B.)

On September 20, 1991, the district

court granted FMCC summary judgment on its counterclaim, awarding
FMCC its claim for damages, attorney's fees and all costs related
to this suit.

(R. at 573-575, Addendum C.)
2

In that summary

judgment, the district court determined that the undisputed facts
revealed that all events had occurred which entitled FMCC to
recover a judgment from Zewadski pursuant to the terms of the
Lease with Zewadski.

(R. at 574.)

The district court also

determined that the Lease was a true lease.

(R. at 574.)

Finally, the district court provided Zewadski with the
opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of FMCC's stated
attorney's fees.

(R. at 575.)

Thereafter, Zewadski filed an Objection to Form of Summary
Judgment Order dated September 20, 1991 and filed various motions
to strike the affidavits for attorney's fees of FMCC's counsel.
(R. at 586, 590.)

Zewadski also filed a Motion for a New Trial

(R. at 594-595) and an Affidavit for Disqualification of Judge
Pat B. Brian from the case.

(R. at 648-651.)

Zewadski's Affidavit for Disqualification of Judge Brian was
denied by District Court Judge Michael R. Murphy.

(R. at 675.)

Also, Zewadski's Objection to Form of Summary Judgment Order
dated September 20, 1991 on FMCC's counterclaims, Motion for a
New Trial, and Motion to Strike the Affidavits of FMCC's counsel
were all denied.

(R. at 679-680.)

Zewadski appeals the January 2, 1990 and the September 20,
1991 orders granting summary judgment.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 6, 19 89, Zewadski entered into a Lease with Rick
Warner for the lease of the Vehicle. (R. at 135.)

The Lease was

duly executed by Zewadski (Depo. of Zewadski at p. 67, R. at
135.)

On January 6, 1989, the Lease was assigned to FMCC.

(R.

at 244.)
Rick Warner did not make any representation to Zewadski that
the Vehicle wais equipped with all-season tires.
Zewadski at pp. 70-72, R. at 135.)

(Depo. of

The only information on which

Zewadski relied that all-season tires were equipment of the 1988
Ford Merkur XR4Ti was a Reno, Nevada newspaper advertisement from
a dealership other than Rick Warner, which obviously related to a
vehicle other than the one Mr. Zewadski leased.

(Depo. of

Zewadski at p. 70, R. at 135.)
By letter dated February 24, 1989, from Zewadski to FMCC and
Rick Warner, Zewadski purported to rescind the Lease.
No. 2, R. at 244.)

(Depo. Ex.

By letter dated March 3, 19 89, from Zewadski

to FMCC, Zewadski again purported to rescind the Lease.
Ex. No. 3, R. at 244.)

(Depo.

On March 9, 19 89, Zewadski voluntarily

surrendered the Vehicle to FMCC and failed to abide by the
voluntary early termination provisions of the contract (Depo. of
Zewadski at pp. 57-58, Depo. Ex. No. 4, R. at 244.)
On April 3, 1989, Zewadski filed his First Amended Complaint
for Rescission of the contract, recovery of damages, deceit and
fraud.

Zewadski alleged that the Vehicle did not drive well in
4

snowy conditions, contrary to the representations of Rick Warner.
(R. at 244-245.)

[Zewadski made other assertions that he did not

pursue in the trial court and has not argued on appeal.]
FMCC conducted a sale of the Vehicle, recovering $10,400.00,
which, along with other amount;-

•. .

*-wadski was entitled,

were properly credited to Zewadski's account.

The sale left a

deficiency amount of $5,692.44 as of August 28, 1989 under the
terms of the Lease.

(R. at 245.)

FMCC incurred total expenses

of $10,654.90 in attorney's fees, court costs and other expenses
to enforce FMCC's rights under the Lease, not ii ncludi ng costs and
fees in this appeal.

(R. at 504-506.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I

The trial court's granting of summary judgment to FMCC,
denying the claims of Zewadski's Complaint and First Amended
Complaint against FMCC, was proper and should be affirmed.
undisputed facts in this case, particularly

The

,..---wadski' s

admissions in his deposition (which deposition was properly used
by FMCC, pursuant to Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure), establish that neither Rick Warner nor FMCC made any
representation that the Vehicle would not slide on snow or ice.
Zewadski's deposition revealed that he obtained that information
from a Reno, Nevada newspaper advertisement by a dealership other
than Rick Warner, and related to a vehicle other than the one he
5

leased.

The district court correctly reasoned that if no such

representations were made by the defendants, then defendants
neither defrauded Zewadski nor did they unconscionably disclaim
any warranties to which Mr. Zewadski was entitled.
POINT II
The district court properly considered and denied all issues
of warranties and alleged unconscionability in this case, because
the Vehicle never failed to perform other than as represented or
warranted.

Zewadski mistakenly argues that summary judgment was

wrongfully granted to FMCC, because certain warranties under the
Lease were improperly disclaimed.

In actuality, the district

court disregarded Zewadski's claims of improper disclaimers and
unconscionability pursuant to a denial of Zewadski's Motion to
Supplement his Complaint and First Amended Complaint, which
raised those claims.

Because it had already been determined that

the undisputed facts revealed no credible showing that the
Vehicle had failed to perform within standards represented by
Rick Warner, the district court reasonably refused to permit
Zewadski to supplement his Complaint or First Amended Complaint
with those issues.
Further, neither Rick Warner nor FMCC have ever argued that
they disclaimed any warranties, which they were not entitled to
disclaim under federal or state law.

Instead, FMCC's argument is

simply that neither Rick Warner nor FMCC ever warranted that the
6

Vehicle would n-t: slide on snow or ice.

Therefore, Zewadski's

appellate arguments regarding representations or warranties were
properly decided by the district court, and his appeal on those
issues shoul d t> • denied.

POINT III
The district court properly granted FMCC summary judgment on
its counterclaim for amounts d/i le i m d e r

the Lease, including

reasonable attorney's fees and costs for this litigation, because
the undisputed facts established Zewadski's default, the amount
of damages, and the absence of defenses asserted by Zewadski.
Further, despite Zewadski's claims in his appellate brief to the
contrary, FMCC submitted appropriate evidence estab] ishing its
entitlement to summary judgment, which evidence verified that all
events had occurred in order for FMCC to properly exercise its
rights under the "Default" section of the Lease, and thereby
collect amounts due and owing, including attorney's fees and
costs incurred for this litigation.

ARGUMENT
This Court has held that extensive quotations from numerous
case authorities and treatises, while helpful, cannot substitute
for the development of appellate arguments explicitly tied to the
record.

West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311

(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Zewadski's brief is a confusing discussion

of his view of the law of contracts, tied together with extensive
7

quotations from case authorities, treatises and statutes, but
lacking any application of the law to the facts of this case.

In

short, Zewadski fails to identify the windmills at which he is
tilting.
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED FMCC'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ZEWADSKI'S
CLAIMS .
Mr. Zewadski's Complaint and First Amended Complaint accuse
defendants Rick Warner and FMCC of deceit and fraud, claiming
that the defendants represented that the Vehicle would not slide
on snow or ice, but that the car in fact did so.
10-11.)

(R. at 3-4, and

Part of Mr. Zewadski's argument was that Rick Warner

allegedly represented that the tires that came with the vehicle
were all-season tires.
The problem with Mr. Zewadski's entire argument is that

Mr.

Zewadski admitted, in his deposition, that Rick Warner did not
make any representation that the Vehicle was equipped with allseason tires or that it would not slide in snowy conditions.1
J

Zewadski's repeated assertion in his brief that FMCC did
not submit evidence in support of its Motions for Summary
Judgment opposing Zewadski fails. FMCC relied upon Zewadski's
deposition, which FMCC correctly referenced in its lower court
pleadings, pursuant to Rule 32. (See e.g., R. at 135-136, 244245.) Zewadski made no timely objection to FMCC's use of
Zewadski's deposition, pursuant to Rule 32, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Indeed, even Zewadski used the deposition pursuant to
Rule 32, to which FMCC offered no timely objection. (Seef e.g.,
R. at 145.) FMCC also relied upon affidavits by FMCC employee,
Nancy Rollins, in support of its Motions for Summary Judgment.
8

Zewadski's deposition further revealed that lie obtained that
informati '

l

Reno, Nevada newspaper advertisement by a

dealership other than Rick Warner relating to a vehicle other
than the one he leased.

Ik, Jt 135•13 6. ) 2

Q
Now, isn't it true, Mr. Zewadski, that the only
place that you learned that all-season tires was part
of a purchase was from the Reno advertisement?
A
That's correct. The Reno newspaper advertisement
mentioned that it was equipped with all-season radial
tires, and I was under the impression that when I
showed that advertisement to Vic Field [a Rick Warner
official] that--which I showed him the advertisement
from the Reno paper to Vic Field, and when I inquired
about the tires and the driveability in the snow, even
though they didn't answer me directly that it had allseason tires, they didn't tell me that it didn't. And
they indicated--Paul Smith [a Rick Warner official]

(R. at 252-55; and 459-61.)
Despite the claims in Zewadski's brief that FMCC was
required to publish Zewadski's deposition, all of the cases w ;xh
Zewadski cited are outdated and have been overruled by t*
drafting of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 32(d) which became
effective January 1, 1987. This Court has even recently held
that subdivision (d) of Rule 32, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
now makes "publication" of a deposition unnecessary. Salt Lake
City Corp v. James Construction, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) .
2

Mr. Zewadski's brief refers, at times, to numerous
affidavits which he submitted to the district court in support of
his many motions, objections, etc. Ford Motor Credit Company is
uncertain what point Zewadski intends to support by these
references to these affidavits. However, in Gaw v. State, 798
P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this Court stated that a party
may not rely on a subsequent affidavit that contradicts his
deposition to create an issue of fact on a motion for summary
judgment, unless the deposition was in error or the partydeponent is able to explain the contradiction in his affidavit.
See also, Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983) .
9

indicated that it would drive fine in the snow with the
story that he related to me.3
Q
You acknowledged earlier today that in the
advertisement that you reviewed on behalf of Rick
Warner Ford, that there was no mention of the type of
tire.
A
No, no mention of the tire in Rick Warner's
advertisement. . . . (Depo. of Zewadski, pp. 70-71; R.
at 135.)
The above text reveals, as did other testimony, that neither
Rick Warner nor FMCC made the kind of representations to Zewadski
that Zewadski claims were made.

Thus, the district court

correctly reasoned that if no such representations were made by
either defendant, then defendants could not, under any circumstances, have defrauded Zewadski nor could they have unconscionably disclaimed any warranties to which Mr. Zewadski was
entitled.
Even in light of the undisputed facts and the extensive
district court review of those facts as applied to the law,
Zewadski has relentlessly reiterated claims of alleged warranty
or service contract problems allegedly caused by defendants.

It

is evident from the record that Mr. Zewadski's contentions are
based, not on the undisputed facts, but upon his own legal
conclusions quite apart from the facts in this case.
3

A portion

The "story" to which Mr. Zewadski referred, was later
explained in his deposition as follows: " . . . what he [Paul
Smith] did was tell me, apparently, an evasive story about a
client that had traded in a Lincoln Mark VII that drove in the
snow all the time and said it was the best car he'd ever had."
(Depo. Zewadski p. 78.)
10

of the transcript of the proceedings cf -he district court from,
August 30, 1991, is illustiat i - . •: \:v. .onfusion that Zewadski
has had on the issues.
The Court: The court will ask you this question
another time, and require that you give a specific
response. Is there any contention by the Plaintiff
that there is a service warranty in issue in this Ccise?
Mr. Zewadski:
contract.

Your honor, the only thing at issue is a

The Court: Did you understand the question? Please
read the question back, Mr. Reporter (the question was
read back by the court reporter).
Mr. Zewadski: I am not familiar with there being any
service warranty whatsoever in this case, your honor.
There is a service contract ,
(R. at 710.)
The Court: Was there ever any allegation by the
Plaintiff that Rick Warner failed to repair the
vehicle.
Mr. Zewadski:
The Court:

No, your honor.

Then why is a service warranty in issue?

Mr. Zewadski:

Because it is invalid, your honor.

The Court: Whether it even exists is immaterial if it
is not in issue.
Mr. Zewadski: I believe it makes the contract an
enforceable and unconscionable contract.
The Court:
at 711.)

Anything further?

Both sides submit? (R.

Mr. Zewadski conceded in open court that there was no
failure by the dealer to repair the vehicle.

The court correctly

held, based upon the undisputed facts and admissions by Zewadski
himself, "that there was no credible evidence showing that the
11

Vehicle failed to perform within acceptable standards."
229.)

(R. at

Because the undisputed facts reveal that neither Rick

Warner nor FMCC ever represented that the Vehicle would not slide
on snow or ice, and there is no credible evidence that the
Vehicle failed to perform within acceptable standards, Zewadski's
claims below and on appeal are mere legal conclusions based upon
Zewadski's opinion, and should be dismissed accordingly.
POINT II
ALL ISSUES OF WARRANTIES WERE PROPERLY
CONSIDERED BY THE DISTRICT COURT AND WERE
DENIED, BECAUSE THE VEHICLE NEVER FAILED TO
PERFORM OTHER THAN AS REPRESENTED OR
WARRANTED.
Zewadski argues on appeal that summary judgment was wrongfully granted to FMCC, because certain warranties under the Lease
were improperly disclaimed. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-17.)
Because of the improper disclaimers, Zewadski argues the entire
lease contract is unconscionable and the Lease is void.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 40.)
Actually, Zewadski is mistaken regarding the district court
procedure.

The district court's decision to disregard issues of

improper disclaimers or unconscionability were based, not on a
summary judgment decision, but on the court's denial of
Zewadski's Motion to Supplement his Complaint and First Amended
Complaint.

That motion, which first raised the wrongful

disclaimer and unconscionability issues, was denied by the court
12

on August 30, 1991, and the court's discussion on the denial ol
that motion is instructive for the present appeal.
Regarding Zewadski's Motion for Leave to Supplement hi s
Complaint and First Amended Complaint, the court has
heard extensive oral argument by Zewadski lasting
approximately 40-45 minutes as to why the court should
grant Zewadski's Motion for Leave to Supplement his
Complaint and First Amended Complaint with new evidence
allegedly relating to the existence of warranties on
the subject vehicle of this lawsuit. The court finds
that Zewadski offered no new factual or legal arguments
beyond those which have been voluminously briefed and
argued at length in a prior hearing on a Motion for
Summary Judgment, and upon which the court issued an
order in FMCC's favor dated January 2, 1991, stating
that no material issues of fact or law remain as to any
fraud allegedly perpetrated by Rick Warner or as to any
warranty issues relevant to this case. On that basis,
Zewadski's Motion for Leave to Supplement his Complaint
and First Amended Complaint is denied. (R. at 500501.)
The district court's ruling on a motion to amend is within the
discretion of the trial court, and that absent a clear abuse of
that discretion, the appellate court will not disti irb a trial
court's ruling on a motion to amend.

Kelly v. Utah Power &

Light, 746 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The district court clearly determined that the undisputed
facts in this case reveal no credible showing that the Vehicle
failed to perform within the standards represented by Rick
Warner.

On that basis, the court reasonably refused to permit

Zewadski to supplement his Complaint or First Amended Complaint
with those issues.
Further, neither Rick Warner nor FMCC have at any time
argued that they were entitled to or did disclaim any warranties,
13

express or implied, which they were not entitled to disclaim
under federal or state law.

FMCC's argument is, and has always

been, simply that neither Rick Warner nor FMCC ever warranted
that the Vehicle would not slide on snow or ice.

Because the

undisputed facts establish that neither Rick Warner nor FMCC
warranted that the Vehicle would perform in any way other than
how it performed, all of Zewadski's appellate arguments regarding
representations or warranty issues, which comprise most of his
brief, were properly decided by the court, and his appeal on
those issues should be denied.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED FMCC
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST
ZEWADSKI FOR AMOUNTS DUE UNDER THE LEASE AND
FOR EXPENSES INCURRED.
The Lease states, at paragraph 24, as follows:
Default: If the lessee fails to make any payment under
this lease when it is due, or if the lessee fails to
keep any other agreement in this lease, the lessor may
terminaite this lease and take back the vehicle. . . .
Even if the lessor retakes the vehicle, the lessee must
still pay at once the sum of (a) the difference, if
any, between the adjusted balance subject to lease
charges . . . and that amount received by Ford Credit
upon the sale of the vehicle at wholesale and (b) all
other amounts then due under the lease. The lessee
must also pay expenses paid by the lessor to enforce
the lessor's rights under the lease, including
reasonable attorneys' fees as permitted by law, and
damages caused to lessor because of the lessee's
default. The lessor may sell the vehicle at public or
private sale with or without notice to the lessee.
(R. at 246-247.)
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The undisputed facts in this case reveal that Zewadski :.:rr-.rted
to rescind the lease by two lettersriat<-jd Pebi LMJ y
March 3, 198

244.).

--

On March 9, 1 989, Zewadski volun-

tarily surrendered the Vehicle to FMCC and failed to abide by tInvoluntary early termination provisions . >£ the contract (R. at
244).

The affidavit of FMCC employee Nancy Rollins proves that

after Zewadski surrendered the Vehicle to FMCC( FMCC sol"; tin
Vehicle at an auction for $10,400.00. (R. at 252-55.)

After

subtracting credits to which Zewadski was entitled, the sales
proceeds were immediately applied to Zewadski's debt due and
owing to FMCC, leaving a remaining obligation of $5,692.44.
at 254.)

(R.

Zewadski has not made payments on the lease since

surrendering the Vehicle to FMCC.

(R. at 254.)

Based upon the foregoing information, the district court
went to extreme lengths, at numerous hearings, to give Zewadski
an opportunity to fully and fairly state any cause of action
which he may legitimately have had and which may afford him a
defense to FMCC's counterclaim.

An excerpt from the transcript

of the proceedings of September 20, 1991 :i llustrates the extent
to which the district court went to accommodate and understand
Zewadski's claims and defenses.
The Court: As a courtesy to the pro se Plaintiff, the
Court has extended privileges in this lawsuit which
would not be extended if you were represented by
counsel. And the Court has stated repeatedly on the
record that, in an effort to be fair in every aspect of
this litigation, the Court has extended pleading privileges and argument privileges and other privileges that
15

relate to the rules of the Court, simply because you
are pro se. Those privileges would not have been
extended to you were you not represented by counsel.
The Court has gone the extra mile repeatedly to understand the basis of your lawsuit, to give you ample
opportunity to argue it, and to plead it, and to rule
upon it. The Court did consider your proposed amended
answer. The Court found that, legally and factually,
it was inappropriate, denied your motion to amend your
answer, and the Court so ruled in our August hearing.
And the Court so rules this morning. . . . (R. at 700701.)
As to the specific issues raised in FMCC's Summary Judgment
Motion on its Counterclaim against Zewadski, and the issues
Zewadski raised in opposition to FMCC, and which the district
court heard and ruled upon, and which issues Zewadski now brings
again before this Court, the same tramscript from September 20,
1991 reflects that District Court Judge Brian correctly stated as
follows:
The Court: The Court finds as follows: the contextual
agreement entered into between the Plaintiff and the
lessor was, in fact, a legal lease. It was not a
security agreement.
The Court further finds that, consistent with the
Plaintiff's own acknowledgment, there has never been,
from the date the vehicle was delivered to the
Plaintiff until the date it was returned to the lessor,
an assertion by the Plaintiff that mechanical problems,
electrical problems, suspension problems, or any other
defective problem existed with the vehicle which was
the subject of the lease.
The Court further finds that the sale of the vehicle by
the defendant was commercially reasonable, that it was
conducted appropriately to obtain the maximum money
from the subject vehicle.
The Court further finds that the allegations by the
Plaintiff relating to the service contract are neither
16

factually nor legally persuasive. Service has never
been an issue in the lawsuit before the court.
The Court further finds that for whatever reasons, the
lessee developed lessee remorse. The lease was valid
on its face, it was enforceable, and the returning of
the leased vehicle by the lessee after 60 days and
4,000 miles had intervened, did not exonerate the
lessee of his responsibilities, pursuant to the terms
and conditions of the lease.
The Court finds that there are
material fact, relating to the
a matter of law, the defendant
Judgment and the relief prayed
(R. at 692-693.)

no genuine issues of
dispute. Therefore, as
is entitled to Summary
for is granted

The transcript reflects that the district court meticulously
and competently reviewed any possible claim which Zewadski may
have had in defense of FMCC's counterclaim.

The court correctly

held that all events had occurred which entitle FMCC to summary
judgment on its counterclaim, as a matter of law.
at 574.)

(See also, R.

Zewadski has failed to even challenge this, let alone

to successfully argue in his brief that there is any evidence to
support a reversal of the district court's decision in this FMCC
is entitled to expenses which it incurred in this lawsuit and in
pursuing Zewadski for amounts owed under the Lease.
CONCLUSION
The undisputed fact, particularly proved by Zewadski's own
acknowledgments, is that neither Rick Warner Ford nor FMCC represented that the Vehicle would not slide when driven on snow and
ice.

Therefore, any and all claims, issues, or defenses that

Zewadski now argues regarding deceit, fraud, service contracts,
17

unconscionability of contract, disclaimers of warranties, whether
implied or expressed, and any other such issues, are merely
Zewadski's own legal conclusions, not supported by any facts.
The trial court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of
FMCC and its decision denying Zewadski's claims against
defendants should be affirmed, and the matter should be remanded
for an award of FMCC's attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
DATED this •>*

day of August, 1992.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
Kim R. Wilson
Thomas F. Taylor
Attorneys for Appellee Ford
Motor Credit Company

tft\895S.252\Appeal.Brf
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Thomas F.
Taylor of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for Appellee,
Ford Motor Credit Company, hereby certifies that on the 3rd day
of August, 1992, he caused to be served upon Guy B. Zewadski, by
first class mail, postage prepaid, four copies of Brief of
Appellee Ford Motor Company.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 1992.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Thjomas F. Taylor
Attorneys for Appellee Ford
Motor Credit Company
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KIM R. WILSON
SNOW# CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
Ford Motor Credit Company
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI,
Plaintiff,
VS.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RICK WARNER LINCOLN-MERCURY
and FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY,
Defendants.
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY,
Counterplaintiff,

Civil No. 89-0901423CN
Judge Pat B. Brian

vs.
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI,
Counterdefendant.

Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the First Amended Complaint came on for hearing,
pursuant to notice, before the above entitled Court, the
Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, on December 14, 1990, at 8:30
a.m. and Ford Motor Credit Company being represented by Kim R.

Wilson, and plaintiff being present and appearing on his own
behalf, and the Court having reviewed the files and records
herein, including the motion, affidavits and extensive memoranda
of the parties in support and opposition to the motion, and
having heard argument of the parties, and it appearing from the
record (1) that statements of Rick Warner Lincoln-Mercury or its
employees were not false, fraudulent nor material
misrepresentations or omissions relating to capabilities of the
vehicle; (2) that all warranties, if any, as to merchantability
or fitness for purpose were excluded; (3) that there is no
credible showing that the vehicle failed to perform within
acceptable standards; (4) that there was no misrepresentation or
omission regarding income tax issues; (5) that there was no
alteration of the lease contract; (6) that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact; (7) and that Ford Motor Credit
Company is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the Court
being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing
therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Ford Motor Credit Company1s Motion for Summary Judgment

be, and the same hereby is, granted.
2.

Plaintiff's Complaint for Recision of Contract, Recovery

of Damages, Deceit, Fraud, and Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint For Recision of Contract, Recovery of Damages, Deceit,
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Fraud, be, and the same hereby are, dismissed with prejudice and
on the merits.
3.

Costs and attorney's fees are awarded to Ford Motor

Credit Company in an amount to be determined in further
proceedings.
4.

Ford Motor Credit Company's Counterclaim against

plaintiff be, and the same hereby is, unaffected by this order
and remains pending.
DATED this

v

day of December, 199CH
BY THE COURT:

Pat B. Brian
District Court Judge
09\bjd\08958.252\surrmary.jtjd
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Harvi Lynn Chiles, being duly sworn, says that she is
employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for Ford Motor Credit Compciny herein; that she served
the attached [PROPOSED] SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Case Number 890901423CN, in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah) upon the parties listed below by placing a
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Brian C. Harrison
Harris, Carter & Harrison
3325 North University Avenue #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Guy B. Zewadski
P. 0. Box 1232 ^
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

Guy B. Zewadski
512 Merritt Avenue
Oakland, CA 94610

and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the 1 / a " day of December, 1990.
i

i

• . _

,.

..

Harvi Lynn~Chi3.es
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this I n
December, 1990

QT3&K5 Qttr/vxvr-

day of

NOTARY PUBLIC
mg in the state of Utah

My Commission Expires:

TabB

f:^B5STRfCTS3URT
Third judicial District

KIM R. WILSON (A3512)
THOMAS F. TAYLOR (A5804)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Counter-Plaintiff FMCC
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

AUG 3 0 1991
Otputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY and
RICK WARNER LINCOLN-MERCURY,
Defendants.
Civil NO. 89-0901423CN
Judge Pat B. Brian
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY
Counter-Plaintiff,
vs.
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI,
Counter-Defendant.

On August 2, 1991, at 8:30 a.m., a hearing was held before
the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Court Judge, on the
following pleadings:
1.

Plaintiff Zewadski's Order to Show Cause;

2.

Plaintiff Zewadskifs Motion to Strike the hearing on
FMCC's Motion for Summary Judgment;

3.

Plaintiff Zewadskirs Motion for Leave to Supplement
Zewadskifs Complaint and First Amended Complaint;

4.

Plaintiff Zewadski!s Motion to Reconsider Order and
Vacate Summary Judgment; and

5.

Counter-claimant Ford Motor Credit Company's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Ford Motor Credit Company ("FMCC") was represented by counsel of
record, Thomas F. Taylor, and Guy Barco Zewadski ("Zewadski")
appeared pro se. The Court, having considered the arguments of
the parties at length, and good cause appearing, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:

1.

Zewadskifs Order to Show Cause was not warranted in

fact or law, was not brought or interposed for a proper purpose,
and was not filed in good faith.
Show Cause is hereby stricken.

Therefore, Zedawskifs Order to

The Court further finds that the

Order to Show Cause was filed to harass and cause delay in
violation of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, the Court finds Zewadski in contempt and sanctions
Zewadski in the sum of $200 to be paid to the Court no later than
August 9, 1991 at 12:00 noon.

In addition, the Court awards to

FMCC its reasonable legal fees and costs of $160.00 which is
supported by an affidavit dated August 5, 1991, and which was
-2-
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incurred by FMCC in its defense of the Order to Show Cause, which
award shall be set forth by separate order.
2.

Regarding Zewadski's Motion to Strike the Hearing on

FMCCfs Motion for Summary Judgment, based upon Zewadski's
contention that FMCC did not file a Notice to Submit for
Decision, the Court denies Zewadski's Motion, and finds that FMCC
had properly filed a Notice of Hearing with the Court on July 9,
1991, that Zewadski had been properly served with that Notice on
July 9, 1991, and that Zewadski conceded to the Court that he was
in no way prejudiced after having received that Notice of
Hearing.
3.

Regarding Zewadski's Motion for Leave to Supplement his

Complaint and First Amended Complaint, the Court heard extensive
oral argument by Zewadski lasting approximately 40-45 minutes as
to why the Court should grant Zewadski's Motion for Leave to
Supplement his Complaint and First Amended Complaint with new
evidence allegedly relating to the existence of warranties on the
subject vehicle in this lawsuit.

The Court finds that Zewadski

offered no new factual or legal arguments beyond those which had
been voluminously briefed and argued at length in a prior hearing
on a Motion for Summary Judgment, and upon which the Court issued
an Order in FMCC's favor dated January 2, 1991, stating that no
material issues of fact or law remained as to amy fraud allegedly
perpetrated by Rick Warner Ford or as to any warranty issues
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relevant to this case.

On that basis,. Zewadskifs Motion for

Leave to Supplement his Complaint and First Amended Complaint is
denied.
4.

For the same grounds stated in paragraph 3 of this

Order, the Court denies Zewadski's Motion for the Court to
reconsider its January 2, 1991 Order and to vacate that Summary
Judgment.
5.

The Court, taking extraordinary steps to give Zewadski

the benefit of explaining and arguing all his claims, grants
Zewadski an additional ten (10) days to supplement his response
to FMCCfs Motion for Summary Judgment on FMCCfs counterclaim.
Zewadski must complete and file said supplemental response by
August 12, 1991 at 12:00 noon.
6.

The Court, taking extraordinary steps to allow Zewadski

a full and fair opportunity to be heard on FMCC's Counterclaim
against him for a deficiency and for attorneys1 fees under the
terms of the subject contract, continues the hearing date for
FMCCTs Motion for Summary Judgment on FMCC's Counterclaim until
August 30, 1991, at 8:30 a.m.
DATED this

2?Q day of August, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

ParB. Brian
District Judge
003\tft\8958.252\order.pid
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Angie White, being duly sworn, says that she is employed by
the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for
Counter-Plaintiff, Ford Motor Credit Company herein; that she
served the attached ORDER (Case Number 89-0901423CN, Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County) upon the parties
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an
envelope addressed to:
Brian C. Harrison, Esq.
HARRIS, CARTER & HARRISON
3325 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, UT 84604
Guy B. Zewadski
P.O. Box 1232
Salt Lake City, UT

84110

and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the

3& day of August, 1991.
L.<L-

Angie Wl;

iLui^.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me tkis c V ^ - day of August,
1991

the State of Utah
My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC i
STEFANIEJ. OYXES '
\K

"^-

or

T

xpirr-s

QO&
^ . ^ I 8 9 «-

STATE OF UTAH
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KIM R. WILSON [A3512]
THOMAS F. TAYLOR [A5804]
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Ford Motor credit Company
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
Plaintiff,
v.
RICK WARNER LINCOLN-MERCURY
and FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY,
Defendants.

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY,
Counterplaintiff,

Civil NO. 89-0901423CN
Judge Pat B. Brian

v.
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI,
Counterdefendant.

Defendant, Ford Motor Credit Company's ("FMCC"), Motion for
summary Judgment on its Counterclaim came on for hearing,
pursuant to Notice, before the above-entitled Court, the
Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, on September 20, 1991, at

9:30 a.m., and FMCC being represented by Thomas F. Taylor, and
Plaintiff being present and appearing on his own behalf, and the
Court having reviewed the files and records herein, including the
Motion, Affidavits and extensive Memoranda of the parties in
support of and in opposition to the Motion, and having heard the
argument of the parties, and it appearing from the record (1)
that any and all other pending motions, objections and other
pleadings had been reviewed and heard by the Court, (2) that
there is no remaining issue as to any material fact in this case,
including but not limited to, such issues regarding service
contracts or warranties, (3) that all events have occurred which
entitle FMCC to recover a judgment from Plaintiff pursuant to the
terms of the Lease, which is the subject of this case, (4) that
the Lease, which is the subject of this lawsuit, is a true lease,
and (5) that FMCC is entitled to judgment on its Counterclaim
against Plaintiff as a matter of law, and the Court being fully
advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore, it
is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

That Plaintiff's Objection to Form of the Order

prepared by FMCC dated

y ^ £) Q -

, 1991, is hereby

denied.
2.

FMCCfs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
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3.

FMCC is hereby granted judgment in the amount of

$5,692.44 plus interest at the rate of 10% per annum from and
after August 28, 1989 to the date hereof.
4.

FMCC is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of

$9,267.50 for all litigation expenses in these proceedings.
5.

FMCC is awarded costs of suit, and post-judgment

interest on the whole award at the rate of 10% per annum.
APPROVED this £

Q day of September, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

•^U- g^-^-

Judge Pat B. Brian
003Ytft\8958.252\sunjgord.pld
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